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A Quarter Century of Death:
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Conclusion
This Symposium has attempted to place into context the changes in
Virginia law since the United States Supreme Court's historic decision in
Furman v. Georgia.' Although the Court's suspension of capital punishment
was short-lived z the decision was important in that it implicitly recognized
that there are constitutional limitations on the imposition of the ultimate
sanction. This Symposium has traced some of the substantive and proce-
dural developments, applications, and deficiencies of Virginia capital punish-
ment law in the post-Furman era.
The first article in this Symposium traced the legislative expansion of
the Virginia capital murder statute.' The statute has been expanded from its
original three to twelve subsections,4 and each of these twelve subsections
has been modified or amended by the General Assembly at least once.
Counting attempts for the predicate felonies and each alternative method of
capital murder listed in the statute, there are now twenty-seven different
capital offenses.' Moreover, at least six new capital offenses are being
contemplated by the General Assembly.
The second article in this Symposium discussed the judicial expansion
of capital murder in Virginia.' The current predicate felonies are robbery,
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (finding then-existing death penalty statutes
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
2. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that "the punishment of
death does not invariably violate the Constitution"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(finding that the Texas capital sentencing procedures did not violate the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments).
3. See Hammad S. Matin, Expansion of Section 18.2.31 of the Virginia Code, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 7 (1999) (Part I this Symposium).
4. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie 1999).
5. See Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 449, 455 & n.57 (1998) (analyzing
Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999) (holding that every single subsection
within section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code is a separate capital murder)).
6. See Heather L. Necklaus, Predicate Felonies in the Context of Capital Cases, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 37 (1999) (Part II this Symposium).
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
rape, forcible sodomy, and object sexual penetration.7 The Virginia courts
have construed the definitions of robbery and rape loosely. As a result, the
definitions of those crimes have expanded over time, thus making more
defendants death eligible. The same trend appears to be emerging in the
context of forcible sodomy and object sexual penetration.
The third, fourth, and fifth articles in this Symposium dealt with the
expansion of the sentencing process. The third article explored the expan-
sion of the future dangerousness aggravating factor! While the language of
the future dangerousness factor has not changed since it was enacted into
law, the evidence accepted to prove the existence of that factor now includes
prior criminal conduct, the circumstances of the offense, and victim impact
evidence. At the same time, although all defendants who are convicted of
capital murder will now die in prison,9 evidence of prison structure and
conditions is generally inadmissible to rebut evidence of future dangerous.
The second aggravating factor is vileness.' 0 Although the United States'
Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Georgia" found Georgia's identical vileness
statute unconstitutional, 2 Virginia's vileness factor has withstood attack.
The fourth article in this Symposium addressed three issues relating to the
constitutionality of the application of the vileness factor. First, the vileness
factor in Virginia has been expanded such that any capital murder will, by
definition, support a vileness finding. 3 Second, because the jury's decision
as to the vileness factor requires it to look only at the defendant's conduct
during the crime, victim impact evidence is irrelevant to vileness. Finally,
if the vileness factor is to afford the jury any assistance in making its finding
thereunder, the Commonwealth ought to be required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of whichever of the vileness sub-elements
(torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery) on which it intends to
rely.
The fifth article in this symposium analyzed the deficiencies of propor-
tionality review in Virginia. 4 Current review is inadequate on three fronts.
The court's inquiry as to whether the sentence was imposed under the
7. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4)-(5) (Michie 1999).
8. SeeJason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues andAnalysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55
(1999) (Part MI this Symposium).
9. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999) (abolishing parole for defendants
who committed felonies on or after January 1, 1995). Although geriatric parole still exists,
there is no geriatric parole for Class 1 felons. VA. CODE ANN. -S 53.1-40.01 (Michie 1999).
10. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1977).
11. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
12. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
13. See Douglas R. Banghart, Vileness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77 (1999)
(Part IV this Symposium).
14. See Kelly E. P. Bennett, Proportionality Review: The HistoricalApplication, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 103 (1999) (Part V this Symposium).
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influence of passion or prejudice is inadequate because it evaluates each piece
of evidence individually rather than the evidence as a whole. The court's
comparative review is likewise flawed because the court only collects the
cases it has reviewed-the overwhelming majority of which involve the
imposition of a sentence of death-and because it fails to take into account
the defendants' personal characteristics. Finally, although Virginia law
requires that, upon request of the defendant, the collection of cases accumu-
lated by the Supreme Court of Virginia for proportionality review be made
available to the circuit courts, they are not.
The first five articles in this Symposium analyzed the substantive and
procedural developments and deficiencies of Virginia's post-Furman v.
Georgia capital scheme. The final article offered suggestions for reform, all
of which could be implemented within the existing statutory scheme." The
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse hopes that the Virginia judiciary and
General Assembly will consider seriously these suggestions. After all, it is
a matter of life and death.
15. See Alix M. Karl, Suggestionsfor Capital Reform in Virginia, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 123
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